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1 Introduction
Backward chaining is a standard technique in automated deduction, partic-
ularly in logic programming systems, often taking the form of a version of
Robinson’s resolution rule [17]. The fundamental question is to determine
whether or not a given formula follows from a given set of formulæ, and there
are various techniques which can be used to guide the search for (the existence
of) a proof.
An instance of this approach is the analysis of logic programming in intu-
itionistic logic [13]. The standard such analysis is that of Miller et al. [13],
based on the notion of uniform proof. Uniform proofs are deﬁned for (a vari-
ety of) cut-free sequent calculi which, because of the subformula property, are
well-adapted to (analyses of) backward chaining.
With more recent interest in logic programming languages based on linear
logic [6], the natural extension of these backward chaining techniques to linear
logic has been much studied [9,16,2,1,4]. Generally, the pattern of development
is similar to that for intuitionistic logic. However, the detail of the analysis
is more intricate than in intuitionistic logic and there are several points of
diversion amongst the various approaches; but the same general procedure is
followed.
Whilst the sequent calculus is a good basis for backward chaining, other
systems for inference in intuitionistic logic provide forward chaining capabil-
ities. Hilbert-type systems are the oldest and perhaps best-known of such
systems [10]. Such systems allow diﬀerent logics to be speciﬁed by diﬀerent
sets of axioms whilst maintaining modus ponens as the sole means of inference.
Another technical expression of forward chaining in intuitionistic logic may
be found in the TP operator used in the semantics of logic programs [3]. Here, a
mapping is deﬁned from interpretations to interpretations, in which the image
is the result of applying the rules of the program to the initial interpretation
via a combination of modus ponens and uniﬁcation. The semantics of the
program is then given by the least ﬁxed point of this operator. It is interesting
to note that this forward chaining system is traditionally used to provide a
ﬁxpoint semantics for SLD-resolution [3], a backward chaining system.
It should be noted that a key property of the modus ponens rule in intu-
itionistic logic is that it preserves equivalence: φ ∧ (φ ⊃ ψ) ≡ φ ∧ ψ. This
strong property greatly simpliﬁes the analysis of this rule of inference. How-
ever, the use of modus ponens in linear logic is not as simple as in intuitionistic
logic since modus ponens does not preserve linear equivalence. For example, in
linear logic p⊗ (p q)  q but, in proving q, we “consume” p. Consequently,
Hilbert-type systems and TP will not readily work for linear logic.
A combination of both backward and forward chaining may be found in de-
ductive database systems such as Aditi [19]. In such systems, which are based
on variants of Prolog, forward chaining is generally used in order to compute
all answers to a query using eﬃcient join algorithms and other techniques from
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relational databases, whilst backward chaining is used for less data-intensive
computational tasks (such as format conversions).
The properties of forward and backward chaining systems for intuitionis-
tic logic are generally well-understood. However, the question of how to best
integrate the two models still remains. Proofs in Hilbert-type systems are,
essentially, structured globally, making the provision of a theoretically satis-
factory treatment of backward chaining techniques, such as resolution, some-
what problematic. However, the strong permutability properties of sequent
calculi, in both intuitionistic and linear logic [12,13,16] with the corresponding
possibility of locally-deﬁnable procedures suggest that it is appropriate to ad-
dress the question of integration of forward chaining features into the sequent
calculus.
This is achieved by inserting directed cuts into an otherwise cut-free sequent
calculus proof. Cut-free proofs are generally used in proof-search to avoid, as
a result of the subformula property, a signiﬁcant amount of non-determinism,
i.e., having to choose a cut-formula arbitrarily. In the case of a directed cut,
the cut-formula will be calculated from the antecedent, and hence will not have
the same problem. Deductive databases form a natural application area for
combined systems. For example, Aditi uses backward and forward chaining
in intuitionistic logic. This is straightforward to model and the techniques
are well-known. We can view the design of Aditi as a particular (and quite
simple) way of inserting directed cuts. The presence of both backward and
forward chaining mechanisms in deductive databases suggests that a similar
integration for linear logic will prove fruitful, especially as linear logic has been
used to model database updates, state-and-action problems and concurrency.
In § 2, we discuss the issues for integrating forward chaining into intu-
itionistic logic. In § 3, we give a similar discussion for linear logic. In § 4,
we present our formal results about forward and backward chaining. In § 5,
we show that our inference rules respect an encoding of intuitionistic logic
programs into linear ones.
2 Forward Chaining in Intuitionistic Logic
The standard account of backward chaining (or goal-directed) inference in
intuitionistic logic is [13]. There it is shown how the following class of formulæ,
known as hereditary Harrop formulæ, can be used in a backward chaining
manner, i.e., as a basis for a complete resolution procedure:
Deﬁnite formulæ D ::= A | D ∧D | ∀x.D | G ⊃ A
Goal formulæ G ::= A | G ∧G | G ∨G | ∀x.G | ∃x.G | D ⊃ G
The key question is, then, how to introduce an appropriate notion of forward
chaining into this framework. Our notion of forward chaining is based on
directed cuts. It is usual, in backward chaining systems, to omit the cut rule
in order to maintain the subformula property; in general, the cut formula
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is entirely arbitrary, making backward chaining proof-search involving this
rule infeasible. This omission is safe, in that the cut-elimination theorem [5]
ensures that it is complete to search for only cut-free proofs. In our case,
we wish to introduce a particular kind of cut known as a directed cut. Here,
whilst the cut formula is not known in advance, we are able to determine it
using certain inference rules, which thus form the forward chaining aspect of
computation.
Our general procedure is to replace an inference with conclusion P  G, in
which P denotes a program, i.e., a ﬁnite multiset of closed deﬁnite formulæ,
arrived at using the usual rules of the intuitionistic sequent calculus, together
with one of the form
P  P ′ P ′  G
P  G
where P  P ′ represents a provability relation between programs. In par-
ticular, P ′ need not be known in advance, but will be calculated during the
course of construction of a proof. In more traditional terms, this represents
a cut; when searching for a proof of P  G, we ﬁrst determine a program P ′
such that P  ∧P ′ and P ′  G. The key technical question is then to ﬁnd
the appropriate rules for the relation  between programs.
This determination of P ′ is reminiscent of interpolation, in particular the
results of [7], in which it is shown that for any uniform proof of P  G,
there is a program P ′ such that P  ∧P ′ and P ′  G, where the latter
proof is considerably simpler than the original one. In particular, P ′ can be
constructed from G by replacing “indeﬁnite” formulæ (such as p ∨ q) with
deﬁnite ones (such as p).
In order to produce the appropriate inference rules for , recall that, as
 is intended as a relation between programs (and hence deﬁnite formulæ),
we can consider  as a means of making deﬁnite inferences (i.e., between
sets of deﬁnite formulæ) and  as a means of making potentially indeﬁnite
inferences (i.e., with deﬁnite formulæ in the antecedent and a goal formula in
the succedent). As a result, we rewrite the inference rule ∧L as below.
P, D1, D2  G
P, D1 ∧D2  G ∧L
P , D1, D2  P ′
P, D1 ∧D2  P ′ ∧L P ′  G
P , D1 ∧D2  G cut
Similar remarks apply to the rules ∀L, WL and CL.
The case for ⊃L is (unsurprisingly) somewhat more intricate. The instance
of this rule specialized to deﬁnite and goal formulæ is as follows:
P  G P, D  Δ
P, G ⊃ D  Δ
The left hand premiss has a directed cut introduced into it. There are then
two diﬀerent forms of this rule, depending on the status of Δ:
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• If Δ is a goal formula G′, then we have the rule
P  P ′ P ′  G P, D  G′
P , G ⊃ D  G′ ⊃
• If Δ is a program P ′′, then we have the rule
P  P ′ P ′  G P, D  P ′′
P , G ⊃ D  P ′′ ⊃
This means that P can be “updated” to P ′ before being used for inference.
Turning to other rules for , it seems reasonable to require that the rela-
tion be reﬂexive, transitive and monotonic, resulting in the following rules:
P  P Axiom
P1  P2 P2  P3
P1  P3 Cut
P1  P3
P1,P2  P3,P2 Weak 
In addition, it would seem reasonable to include a version of the cut rule
in which the conclusion is P  G, i.e.,
P  P ′ P ′  G
P  G Cut 
Given these rules, it is possibly to simplify the implication rules. In par-
ticular, we can omit the rightmost premiss of the ⊃. We can recover the
original rule by use of the Cut  rule as follows:
P  P ′ P ′  G
P , G ⊃ D  P , D ⊃ P , D  P ′′
P, G ⊃ D  P ′′ Cut
Also, the ⊃ rule can be replaced by a combination of the (simpliﬁed) ⊃
rule and Cut , as follows:
P  P ′ P ′  G
P , G ⊃ D  P , D ⊃ P , D  G′
P, G ⊃ D  G′ Cut 
Note that as  is a proof relation between deﬁnite formulæ, we need to
take some care when “synchronizing” an inference P  P ′ with P ′  G.
For example, we have that ∀x.p(x)  ∃z.p(f(z)) and ∀x.p(x)  p(f(y)), but
p(f(y))  ∃z.p(f(z)). Hence when interpreting a succedent P ′ in P  P ′, we
need to “repackage” the formulæ in P ′. In particular, given a derivation of
P  P ′, in order to use P ′ on the left of  we need to replace it with ∀(∧P ′).
As ∀x.F1 ∧ F2 ≡ ∀x.F1 ∧ ∀xF2 in intuitionistic logic, it is suﬃcient merely to
put the universal quantiﬁers outermost in the formula. For example, if P ′ is
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{p(x), q(x, y)}, then ∀(∧P ′) is {∀x.∀y.p(x)∧ q(x, y)}. Hence we arrive at the
set of inference rules in Deﬁnition 2.1.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A derivation tree is a proof tree governed by the following
rules:
P  P Axiom P, A  A Axiom 
P  P ′
P , D  P ′ W 
P , D,D  P ′
P, D  P ′ C 
P  P ′′ P ′′  P ′
P  P ′ Cut
P  P ′ ∀(∧P ′)  G
P  G Cut 
P  P ′
P,P ′′  P ′,P ′′ Weak
P  P ′ ∀(∧P ′)  G
P , G ⊃ D  P , D ⊃
P , D1, D2  P ′
P , D1 ∧D2  P ′ ∧
P  G1 P  G2
P  G1 ∧G2 ∧ 
P , D[t/x] P ′
P,∀x.D  P ′ ∀
P  G[y/x]
P  ∀x.G ∀ 
P  Gi
P  G1 ∨G2 ∨ 
P  G[t/x]
P  ∃x.G ∃ 
The rule ∀  has the usual restriction that y is not free in P or G.
Note that the Cut  and ⊃ rules have the same premises. Note also
that the rules ∧  and ∀  are reminiscent of the [−] mapping of [13]. In
fact, if we were to replace the ∧L and ∀L rules of the intuitionistic sequent
calculus with ∧ and ∀ respectively, then these two rules would eﬀectively
construct the [−] mapping.
3 Forward Chaining in MAILL
We extend the analysis above to the fragment of linear logic known as MAILL
(Multiplicative Additive Intuitionistic Linear Logic), in which the connective
 is absent. There is no great technical problem with extending the analysis
to the full logic but the development is conceptually simpler without it.
One of the key technical issues when extending the above considerations
to logics which contain multiplicative rules is that modus ponens no longer
preserves equivalence. As the rules of contraction and weakening do not apply,
we now have to make a choice as to whether to use a given instance of a formula
as an “input” to a rule, or to preserve it. For example, in the multiplicative
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fragment of linear logic, we have that p, p q  q but that p, p q  p⊗q and
p, p q  p q: The modus ponens rule acts more like a committed choice,
as, unlike the intuitionistic case, there is no way to preserve equivalence.
The mixture of multiplicative and additive fragments introduces further
complexities. Consider, for example, the program p, !(p  q). Here we can
either use p as an “input” to the rule !(p q) but as we cannot make a copy of
p, in doing so we “lose” the use of p. Hence, we have both p, !(p q)  p and
p, !(p q)  q, according to whether we preserve or use p. One way to express
this succinctly is to note that in this case we have that p, !(p  q)  p  q.
The interaction between the multiplicative and additive fragments in this way
is an important technical issue.
As for the intuitionistic case, discussed in § 2, we wish to be able to replace
(roughly speaking) any occurrence of P  G in a backward chaining proof with
P  P ′ and P ′  G, i.e., incorporating into this inference a linear version of
the Cut  rule, thus converting it into a mixed forward chaining and backward
chaining proof.
First, let us consider theL rule of intuitionistic linear logic, specialized
appropriately to deﬁnite formula and goal formulæ:
P1  G P2, D  Δ
P1,P2, G D  Δ
As above, we readily obtain the rule
P1  P ′ P ′  G P2, D  G′
P1,P2, G D  G′ 
and similarly the rule
P1  P ′ P ′  G P2, D  P3
P1,P2, G D  P3 
As above, the  rule can be simpliﬁed (by omitting the rightmost
premise) and the  rule eliminated by an appropriate use of the rules Cut
 and Cut . Also as above, we re-write the left rules (∀L, ⊗L, L, !L, 1L,
W!L, C!L) in the obvious manner.
Two further points of diﬀerence with the intuitionistic case remain. One is
that, as discussed above, the linear version of modus ponens does not preserve
equivalence. Hence it is possible for there to be two programs P1 and P2
such that P  P1 and P  P2 where P1 and P2 are not equivalent, which
makes it seem reasonable to adopt the following rule (pace the comments on
reconstruction below):
P  P1 P  P2
P  (⊗P1) (
⊗P2) Collect
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It is this rule that enables us to conclude that p, !(p q) p q, !(p q),
which enables us to state completeness results in a straightforward manner.
The other point is that in order to be able to make appropriate conclusions
involving exponentials, and ! in particular, it seems necessary to include a
version of the !R of the linear sequent calculus.
As noted above, as  is a relation between programs, in proof-theoretic
terms, it is a relation between antecedents. So, given P  P ′, it will generally
be the case that P ′ is in clausal form, which means that reconstruction of the
program corresponding to P ′ will be necessary. For an example, consider the
provable sequent
∀x.p(f(x)), ∀x.q(g(x)), !∀x.p(x) r(x), !∀y.q(y) s(y)  ∀x.r(f(x))⊗∀y.s(g(y))
which has the following proof in the linear sequent calculus, in which, for
clairity, we refer to ∀x.p(f(x)) as A, ∀x.q(g(x)) as B, !∀x.p(x) r(x) as !C
and !∀y.q(y) s(y) as !D):
p(f(z))  p(f(z)) r(f(z))  r(f(z))
p(f(z)), p(f(z)) r(f(z))  r(f(z))  L
A, p(f(z)) r(f(z))  r(f(z)) ∀L
A,C  r(f(z)) ∀L
A, !C  r(f(z)) !L
A, !C  ∀x.r(f(x)) ∀R
q(g(w))  q(g(w)) s(g(w))  s(g(w))
q(g(w)), q(g(w)) s(g(w))  s(g(w))  L
B, q(g(w)) s(g(w))  s(g(w)) ∀L
B,D  s(g(w)) ∀L
B, !D  s(g(w)) !L
B, !D  ∀y.s(g(y))
A,B, !C, !D  ∀x.r(f(x))⊗ ∀y.s(g(y)) ⊗R
For the version containing , we get the following proof, made up of two
sub-proofs joined by a cut:
Sub-proof 1:
p(f(z)) p(f(z)) p(f(z))  p(f(z))
p(f(z)), B, p(f(z)) r(f(z)), !C, !D  r(f(z)), B, !C, !D 
A,B, !C, !D  r(f(z)), B, !C, !D ∀L,C!L, !L
Sub-proof 2:
q(g(z)) q(g(w)) q(g(z))  q(g(w))
r(f(z)), q(g(w)), q(g(w)) s(g(w)), !C, !D  r(f(z)), s(g(w)), !C, !D 
r(f(z)), B, !C, !D  r(f(z)), s(g(w)), !C, !D ∀L,C!L, !L
Overall:
....
A,B, !C, !D  r(f(z)), B, !C, !D
....
r(f(z)), B, !C, !D  r(f(z)), s(g(w)), !C, !D
A,B, !C, !D  r(f(z)), s(g(w)), !C, !D Cut
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Note that in order to derive the ﬁnal result of ∀x.r(f(x))⊗∀y s(g(y)), we need
to “package up” the ﬁnal state reached, essentially by using the equivalent
of the left inference rules ∀L and ⊗L. This is just the inverse of the clausal
decomposition mapping [−] of [16]; in order to recover the appropriate program
from the derived multiset of clausal formulæ, we need to use the inverse of
this mapping. For example, if we ﬁnd that P  {p(x), q(x), r(y)}, then we
interpret this as showing that P  (∀x.p(x)⊗ q(x))⊗ ∀y.r(y).
4 A Calculus and Its Properties
First we deﬁne the class of deﬁnite and goal formulæ under consideration.
This is essentially the class of formulæ from [16] restricted to MAILL, i.e., no
occurrences of , ⊥ or ?. We also omit goals containing implications, again
for reasons of technical simplicity. In addition, we do not consider the units 
and 0 (see [16]). However, we do permit formulæ of the form G D rather
than just G A, which are more natural for forward chaining proofs.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Deﬁnite and goal formulæ are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnite formulæ: D ::= A | 1 | D ⊗D | D D
| ∀x.D |!D | G D
Goal formulæ: G ::= A | 1 | G⊗G | GG | G⊕G
| ∀x.G | ∃x.G |!G
A program is a ﬁnite multiset of closed deﬁnite formulæ.
As the example of the previous section shows, we need to be able to recon-
struct a program from its “decomposed” form. As noted in [16], it is important
to know whether a given variable has been quantiﬁed within the scope of a
! or not. For example, in the formula ∀x. !∀y.p(x, y) x is global, i.e., it does
not require renaming when the formula is copied, and y is local, i.e., it does
require renaming when the formula is copied. As in [16], we will assume that
there is a means of identifying global and local variables from their names
alone, which will resolve the ambiguity above. Note that !∀x.∀y.p(x, y) and
!∀x. !∀y.p(x, y) are equivalent; so we need no ﬁner distinction than global and
local in the above sense.
It should also be noted that unlike in classical logic (and to a lesser extent,
intuitionistic logic) we cannot simply move quantiﬁers past formulæ which do
not contain the quantiﬁed variable. For example, ∀x.p⊗q(x) is not equivalent
to p ⊗ ∀x.q(x). However, it is possible to argue that the latter version is
more natural than the former. Hence we introduce below the notion of tightly
quantiﬁed formulæ.
The key point is to determine the appropriate place for quantiﬁers. This
is not simply a matter of ﬁnding all formulæ which contain the quantiﬁed
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variable. For example, given the formula p(x, y) ⊗ q(y, z) ⊗ r(z, x), it should
be clear that the appropriate quantiﬁed formula is ∀x.∀y.∀z.p(x, y)⊗ q(y, z)⊗
r(z, x). However, for the formula p(x, y) ⊗ q(y, z) ⊗ r(v, w), it would be
(∀x.∀y.∀z.p(x, y)⊗ q(y, z))⊗ (∀v.∀w.r(v, w)).
From these considerations, we arrive at the deﬁnitions below. We denote
the free variables of a formula F as free(F ), and
⋃
F∈P free(F ) as free(P).
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let P be a multiset of deﬁnite formulæ and let x, y ∈ free(P).
The variables x and y are connected in P if ∃F ∈ P such that x, y ∈ free(F ),
or ∃z, F such that x, z ∈ free(F ) and z and y are connected in P .
A free variable x in free(P) is connected to a formula F ∈ P if x is
connected to a free variable in F .
A formula ∀x1 . . .∀xn.F1⊗Fk is tightly quantiﬁed if xi is connected to each
Fj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k and each Fj is tightly quantiﬁed.
Note that we need only consider formulæ of the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xn.F1⊗Fk in
this deﬁnition, as ∀x.p q(x) is equivalent to p ∀x.q(x), as are ∀x.p q(x)
and p  ∀x.q(x). Hence we may consider that all universal quantiﬁers are
pushed innermost in this manner.
We will assume that all programs under consideration in this paper from
hereon are tightly quantiﬁed.
We are now in a position to deﬁne the “recomposition” operator.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Let {P1, . . .Pn} be a maximal partition of a multiset of deﬁ-
nite formulæ P such that free(Pi) ∩ free(Pj) = ∅ for i = j.
We deﬁne ♦P as
n⋃
i=1
∀(⊗Pi). We deﬁne ♠P as
n⊗
i=1
∀(⊗Pi).
Note that as all formulæ are tightly quantiﬁed, all we need to do to deter-
mine where the quantiﬁer should be is to determine the minimal scope which
includes all occurrences of the (free) variable in question.
Deﬁnition 4.4 A derivation tree is a proof tree governed by the following
rules:
P  P Axiom A  A Axiom 
P  P ′
P , !D  P ′ W 
P , !D, !D  P ′
P, !D  P ′ C 
P  P ′′ P ′′  P ′
P  P ′ Cut
P  P ′ ♦P ′  G
P  G Cut 
P  P ′
P ,P ′′  P ′,P ′′ Weak
P1  P ′ ♦P ′  G
P1,P2, G D  P2, D 
P, Di  P ′
P , D1 D2  P ′ 
P , D1, D2  P ′
P, D1 ⊗D2  P ′ ⊗
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P, D  P ′
P , !D  P ′ !
P  P ′
P ,1 P ′ 1
P, D[t/x] P ′
P,∀xD  P ′ ∀
P  P1 . . . P  Pn
P  (♠P1) . . . (♠Pn) Collect
!P  P ′
!P !♦P ′ !M
 1 1 
P  G1 P ′  G2
P ,P ′  G1 ⊗G2 ⊗ 
P  G1 P  G2
P  G1 G2  
P  Gi
P  G1 ⊕G2 ⊕ 
!P  G
!P !G ! 
P  G[y/x]
P  ∀x.G ∀ 
P  G[t/x]
P  ∃x.G ∃ 
We will often use P  P ′ as a shorthand for the statement that P  P ′ has
a derivation tree.
We now show that the rules above are sound, i.e., that any proof in the
above system has a corresponding proof in the linear sequent calculus.
Proposition 4.5 (soundness) Let P be a multiset of deﬁnite formulæ. Then
if P  P ′ then P  ♠P ′.
Proof. A simple induction on the length of the derivation. 
The following corollary is immediate:
Corollary 4.6 Let P be a multiset of deﬁnite formulæ and let G be a goal
formula. Then if P  P ′ and ♦P ′  G then P  G.
In order to prove a corresponding completeness result, we need the concept
of the depth of a formula, which will form a bound on the indeﬁnite part of
the proof, i.e., the part that uses rules for  rather than .
Deﬁnition 4.7 We deﬁne the depth of a formula F as follows:
depth(A) = 0, where A is atomic
depth(♣F ) = 1 + depth(F ), where ♣ is a unary connective
depth(F1♥F2) = 1 + max(depth(F1), depth(F2)),
where ♥ is a binary connective
We deﬁne depth(F) = ΣF∈Fdepth(F ).
We can now establish completeness.
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Proposition 4.8 (completeness) Let P be a multiset of deﬁnite formulæ,
D be a deﬁnite formula and G be a goal formula. Then
(i) if P  ♠P ′, then P  P ′,
(ii) if P  D, then P  D, !P ′, for some P ′,
(iii) if P  G, then ∃P ′ such that P  P ′ and ♠P ′  G, and
(iv) if P  G, then ∃P ′ such that P  P ′ and ♠P ′  G where the size of the
proof of P ′  G is not more than depth(G).
Proof.
(i) (Sketch) An inductive argument based on the size of the proof. The
only interesting cases are for the right rules, such as ⊗R. In this case,
if ♠P ′ = D1 ⊗ D2, then given the premisses P1  D1 and P2  D2, by
the hypothesis P1  P ′1 and P2  P ′2 where Di = ♠P ′i, and so by a
combination of Cut  and Weak  we get P1,P2  P ′1,P ′2 as required.
(ii) Follows from (1) and the ability to permute W  upwards (see result
below).
(iii) Trivial, as P  P .
(iv) (Sketch) An inductive argument based on the size of the proof. This
based on (3) and transformations which “transfer” occurrences of left
rules in the proof of ♠P ′  G to inferences in the proof of P  P ′.

Note that (1) above directly reﬂects that is an alternative characteriza-
tion of provability between deﬁnite formulæ; (2) above is a slight restatement
of this, in that a given deﬁnite formula could be the result of a proof (using )
involving weakening, which corresponds to a proof (using ) in which W 
is used; (3) is a moderately general completeness result; and (4) is an extreme
instance of it. As noted above, (3) is trivially true in that P  P . How-
ever, note that there may be many P ′ with this property, including one, as
shown in (4), in which the forward chaining aspect is maximized, as the size
of the backward chaining one is limited to the minimum number of inferences
required to decompose G into atoms. Hence (3) and (4) between them show
the range of possibilities for mixing the two approaches to inference.
It should be clear that the amount of mandatory forward chaining is in-
versely proportional to the degree of freedom allowed in the proof of P ′  G;
the greater the freedom, the more scope there is for backward chaining. Hence
strategies which are neither maximal nor minimal in this respect will require
an appropriate statement of the requirements for the proof.
One aspect of the inference rules above is that the W rule (like its coun-
terpart in the linear sequent calculus) can always be permuted upwards. This
means that consequences are not “lost” in the computation, but in the man-
ner of (2) above, can be “picked out” of the context. In practice, we should
not expect to use the W  rule, in order to retain as much information as
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possible. A similar observation is that it is always possible to use a version
of the  rule in which the left hand premiss is an axiom. Essentially, this
normalized form of the rule corresponds to a greater degree of forward chain-
ing, in that we do not have an intermediate result P ′, but directly determine
the consequences of the program.
Deﬁnition 4.9 An instance of the  rule is called basic if the left-hand
premiss is an axiom, i.e., P = P ′. A proof is basic if every instance of 
in the proof is basic. A proof is strong if it contains no occurrences of W .
Basic proofs are such that repeated occurrences of the  rule are not
nested, but occur sequentially (combined by occurrences of Cut, where nec-
essary). Hence basic proofs are “ﬂatter” with respect to occurrences of
than non-basic ones. This may be considered the technical eﬀect of ensuring
that only “deﬁnite” information is used in forward chaining inferences, in that
the information used to prove the body of the clause is directly present in the
program.
Strong proofs give a technical characterization of the observation that in-
formation should be preserved, whenever possible, and hence the W  rule
should be avoided.
It is not hard to establish the following results:
Proposition 4.10 If P  P ′, then
(i) there is a basic proof of P  P ′, and
(ii) there is a strong proof of P  P ′,P ′′ for some P ′′.
Proof.
(i) (Sketch) A simple induction based on the transformation
....
P  P ′
....
P ′  G
P , G D  D  =⇒
....
P  P ′
P ′  P ′ Ax
....
P ′  G
P ′, G D  D 
P , G D  D Cut
(ii) (Sketch) A simple induction based on the upward permutability of W
and its absorption into the Axiom  rule.

5 Encoding IL in MAILL
In [16], the following mapping was used to encode hereditary Harrop formulæ
into linear logic:
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(A)− = A
(G1 ∧G2)− = (G1)−  (G2)−
(G1 ∨G2)− = (G1)− ⊕ (G2)−
(∃x.G)− = ∃x . (G)−
(∀x.G)− = ∀x . (G)−
(D ⊃ G)− = (D)+ (G)−
D+ = ⋃D∈D (D)+
(A)+ = !A
(D1 ∧D2)+ = ! (D1)+⊗ ! (D2)+
(∀x.D)+ = ! (∀x . (D)+)
(G ⊃ A)+ = !((G)− A).
If we take this encoding of hereditary Harrop formulæ into a fragment of the
linear counterpart, then there is a proof of the original sequent in intuitionistic
logic iﬀ there is a proof of the encoded sequent in linear logic. Indeed, it
was shown in [16] that this encoding respects uniform provability, i.e., an
intuitionistic hereditary Harrop sequent P  G has a uniform proof if and
only if (P)−  (G)+ has a uniform proof in linear logic. (The appropriate
notion of uniform proof linear logic, i.e., “resolution proof”, is set up in [16].)
Applying this encoding to the rules governing a derivation tree in linear
logic yields the rules governing a derivation tree in intuitionistic logic. In the
following we use a subscript L or I to indicate which system of rules we are
using. We have the following:
Proposition 5.1 Let P be a set of hereditary Harrop formulæ and G be a
goal formula. Then
(i) P I G (uniformly) iﬀ (P)+ L (G)− (uniformly), and
(ii) P I P ′ iﬀ (P)+ L (P ′)+.
Proof.
(i) This was shown in [16].
(ii) First, we observe that a number of rules (Cut, Cut , Axiom, and
Weak) are common to the two systems.
Next we observe that applying the encoding ()+ to a program always
yields a collection of clauses whose outermost connective is !, that is if
(P)+ = P ′ then P ′ =!P ′′ for some P ′′. In order to derive a suitable P ′′
we may need to use the equivalence (!P)⊗ (!Q) ≡!(P Q).
Given that the programs produced by the encoding are of this form
the structural rules (W  and C ) in the two systems are obviously
equivalent. Also, the intuitionistic axiom rule
P , A I A Axiom 
reduces to the inference:
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AL A Axiom
!AL A !
!P , !AL A W 
We now brieﬂy sketch the proof of equivalence under the encoding of
the ∧  rule for both systems. The proof for the other  rules is similar.
We want to prove that P I F1 ∧ F2 iﬀ (P)+ L (F1 ∧ F2)−. The latter
sequent is (by deﬁnition of the encoding) (P)+ L (F1)−  (F2)− giving
the desired result:
....P I F1
....P I F2
P I F1 ∧ F2 ∧ 
....
(P)+ L (F1)−
....
(P)+ L (F2)−
(P)+ L (F1)−  (F2)− 
(P)+ L (F1 ∧ F2)− ≡
Finally, we sketch the equivalence proof for ∧ . We want to show
that P , D1∧D2 I P2 iﬀ (P , D1∧D2)+ L (P2)+. This is shown by the
following inference. Note that the ﬁnal step in the right inference relies
on the encoding producing nonlinear programs.
....P, D1, D2 I P2
P , D1 ∧D2 I P2
....
(P , D1, D2)+ L (P2)+
(P)+, !(D1)+, !(D2)+ L (P2)+ ≡
(P)+, !(D1)+⊗!(D2)+ L (P2)+ ⊗
(P)+, (D1 ∧D2)+ L (P2)+ ≡
(P , D1 ∧D2)+ L (P2)+ ≡

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